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Abstract Studies on direct comparative judgments typically
show that, for items that are positively evaluated, a single item
randomly drawn from a larger set of similar items tends to be
judged as better than average (the BTA effect). However,
Windschitl, Conybeare, and Krizan (2008) demonstrated that,
under timing conditions that do not favor focusing attention
on the single item, the reversal of the BTA effect occurs. We
report two experiments showing that the magnitude of the
reversed BTA effect increases as a function of the size of a
multiitem referent with which a single item target is compared.
Specifically, in direct comparative judgments of the attractive-
ness of positively evaluated objects (nice-looking cloth
buttons, attractive buildings, or cupcakes), underestimation
of the attractiveness of singletons, as compared with a
multiitem set (reversed BTA effect), increased with the in-
creased set size. Analysis of absolute judgments obtained for
singletons and for small and large multiitem sets suggests that,
for attractive stimuli, both the reversed BTA effect in compar-
ative judgments and its sensitivity to set size occur as a result
of a positive relationship between set size and perceived
attractiveness in absolute judgments.
Keywords Better-than-average effect . Set size . Absolute
judgment . Comparative judgment . Nonsocial stimuli .
Reversed effect
Having to make a comparison between a specific item and a
set of remaining items constitutes a common dilemma. Is this
box of chocolates higher quality than most, so it deserves a
higher price? Is this used car in a better condition than a typical
used car in this price range and should therefore be further
considered? Is this job applicant clearly better than an average
candidate in the pool and should be selected for an interview?
Each of these questions calls for a direct comparative judg-
ment between a specific item (singleton) and a multiitem set
from which that specific item was drawn.
There is extensive empirical evidence that such comparisons
can lead to biased judgments in which the extremity of a
singleton is overemphasized. For items that are positively eval-
uated, a single item is typically judged as better than average (the
BTA effect). Thus, in the social domain, a randomly selected
individual is typically judged as having more positive charac-
teristics than the group average (e.g., Klar, 2002; Klar & Giladi,
1997, 1999; Suls, Lemos, & Lockett, 2002). This occurs even
when knowledge concerning that individual is very limited—for
instance, when the individual is denoted by an identification
number only (Klar & Giladi, 1997). Furthermore, in making
comparisons between self (singleton) and others (multiple-item
set), people typically see themselves as more likely than average
to experience events that are relatively common and less likely
than average to experience events that are relatively rare
(Chambers, Windschitl, & Suls, 2003; Kruger & Burrus,
2004). They also believe that they perform better than average
on tasks that are relatively easy and less than average on difficult
tasks (Kruger, 1999). Thus, in making direct comparisons be-
tween individuals and groups, individuals are typically judged
as more extreme than the groups, more likely to experience
common events and possess common characteristics, and less
likely to experience uncommon events and possess uncommon
characteristics.
Experimental evidence for overemphasizing the extremity
of a singleton involved in direct comparisons with multiitem
sets is not limited to social objects. Specifically, for positively
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evaluated nonsocial objects (such as liked songs, healthy food,
or pleasant-smelling soaps), single items tend to be judged as
more positive than the average of the remaining items from the
same group. For instance, when participants were asked to
smell six pleasant-smelling soaps and were subsequently pre-
sented with a randomly chosen soap from that set and were
asked to judge its smell, as compared with the average of the
five remaining soaps, they typically judged the singleton as
having a more pleasant smell than the average of the remaining
soaps. The opposite pattern occurred for sets of unpleasant-
smelling soaps (Giladi & Klar, 2002, Experiment 1).
A notable exception to this pattern of results comes from
research byWindschitl, Conybeare, and Krizan (2008). Using
photographs of nonsocial objects such as sofas, hotel rooms,
or vacation spots that were preselected as highly attractive,
they obtained a reversal of the usual BTA effect. Specifically,
in making direct comparisons between a single item and a
four-item set, participants judged the singletons as less attrac-
tive than the rest of the set.1 This occurred evenwhen singletons
were denoted as targets and multitarget sets were denoted as
referents, a condition normally conducive to obtaining classic
BTA effects (cf. Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Suls,
Chambers, Krizan,Mortensen, Koestner, &Bruchmann, 2010).
In explaining the reversal of the usual BTA effect,
Windschitl and colleagues (2008) speculated that the experi-
mental procedures used in previous studies tended to increase
the relative salience, at the time the judgment was made, of the
single-item object rather than the multiitem set involved in the
comparison. For instance, participants in Giladi and Klar’s
(2002) experiments were first familiarized with a set of items
(e.g., soaps) and only subsequently were presented with a
randomly selected singleton (e.g., a specific soap) and asked
to make a comparative judgment. Thus, it is likely that at the
time the judgment was made, the singleton was more salient
for the participants than the remaining items involved in the
comparison. Because salient objects tend to be judged as more
extreme (see Hagemann, Strauss, & Leising, 2008; Kardes,
Sanbonmatsu, Cronley, & Houghton, 2002), the BTA/worse-
than-average (WTA) effects for positive and negative items,
respectively, would be expected.
In a related finding, Windschitl et al. (2008) showed that in
indirect comparisons—that is, when participants made sepa-
rate attractiveness judgments of attractive sets and single-
tons—attractiveness judgments were lower for singletons than
for the sets. This finding is, of course, consistent with the
results they obtained for direct comparisons. If, judged sepa-
rately, singletons are seen as less attractive thanmultiitem sets,
other things being equal (e.g., absence of strong enough
factors enhancing relative salience of singletons, as compared
with such sets), singletons should be judged as less attractive
also in direct comparisons with multiple-item sets, which is
exactly what Windschitl et al. found. While the exact reasons
for results involving indirect comparisons are not entirely
clear (cf. Windschitl et al., 2008), the reversal of the usual
BTA effect for singletons when they are directly compared
with multiitem sets, in the absence of critical factors increas-
ing the salience of singletons, would be expected.
In the present experiments, we had two principal goals. First,
we attempted to provide a conceptual replication of the reversed
BTA effect for direct comparisons involving attractive single-
tons and multiitem sets. Second, we examined the impact of the
size of the multiitem set on the magnitude of the effect.
Previous attempts to address the impact of set size have
been limited to experimental procedures conducive to produc-
ing classic BTA/WTA effects, and not the reversed effect
reported by Windschitl et al. (2008). Moreover, the results of
such attempts have been inconclusive. Thus, Price, Smith, and
Lench (2006, Experiment 2) reported that the tendency to see
the self as less vulnerable to relatively uncommon negative
life events increased as a logarithmic function of the size of the
comparison group. Yet Suls et al. (2010) found no reliable
impact of the size of the comparison group on the classic BTA/
WTA effect for either positive or negative and either social or
nonsocial stimuli.
With respect to the reversed BTA effect, we propose that,
for attractive items, a larger size of the multiitem set used in
direct comparisonwould be associatedwith a greater tendency
to judge the singleton as worse than the set. Thus, a stronger
reversed BTA effect should be observed. We believe that this
prediction follows from at least two arguments. First, a larger
set should be more likely to include items that constitute
particularly strong examples of whatever is the predominant
focal characteristic of the entire sample—for instance, items
that are particularly attractive. Because such stimuli tend to
attract attention, this “pick the best” strategy (Szutkiewicz-
Szekalska & Niewarowski, in press; Windschitl et al., 2008)
would result in more pronounced disadvantage of singletons
over larger sets. Second, as described by the sample size bias
hypothesis (Smith & Price, 2010), a larger set size may be
confused by observers with a more extreme standing on a
relevant dimension. For instance, in estimating a mean value
of a set of numbers, people typically give more inflated
estimates for larger than for smaller sets (Smith & Price,
1 Such reversal of the classic BTA (better-than-average) effect should be
distinguished from the classic WTA (worse-than-average) effect. The
classic WTA effect occurs when, compared to multi-item sets, singletons
are judged as lower on a given dimension (e.g., attractiveness) for stimuli
that, in general, are relatively low on that dimension (e.g., are relatively
unattractive). Thus, in the case of the classic WTA effect singletons are
judged as relatively more extreme (same as is the case in the classic BTA
effect). In contrast, the reversed BTA effect occurs when, compared to
multi-item sets, singletons are judged as lower on a given dimension, for
stimuli that tend to be high on that dimension (e.g., are relatively attrac-
tive). Thus, in this case, singletons are judged as relatively less extreme,
compared to multi-item sets. Similarly, higher judgments for singletons
compared to multi-item sets obtained for stimuli that are relatively low on
a given dimension (e.g., relatively unattractive) would indicate the rever-
sal of the classic WTA effect.
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2010). Similarly, stimuli that are larger in size tend to be
judged as more attractive than smaller stimuli (Silvera,
Josephs, & Giesler, 2002). Finally, in estimating the average
height of a set of human figures, people give higher estimates
in the case of larger than in the case of smaller sets (Price et al.,
2006, Experiment 5). This happens even when all figures
included in a given set are of the same height, thus excluding
the “pick the best” strategy as the sole underlying mechanism.
In any case, the question of the underlying mechanism not-
withstanding, the reversed BTA effect, as demonstrat-
ed by Windschitl et al., should be more pronounced
for larger than for smaller sets involved in direct
comparisons with singletons.
We tested this prediction in two experiments modeled on
the direct comparison procedure used in Windschitl et al.
(2008, Experiment 2). However, unlike in the original exper-
iment, the size of the multiitem referents that participants used
in making direct comparisons with singleton targets was, in
the present experiments, systematically varied.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants One hundred fifty-four Polish college students
(106 women, 48 men) participated in the experiment.
Stimuli We took photographs of 60 cloth buttons bought at a
local haberdashery store. Photographs were digitally proc-
essed to remove differences in the size of the buttons. Attrac-
tiveness of each button was assessed on a 5-point Likert-type
scale by an independent sample of 77 students. Fifty attractive
buttons with means higher than the scale midpoint were
selected as stimuli for the experiment.
Design and procedure Participants were tested individually in a
computer lab. There were 38 trials, each calling for a direct
comparative judgment of attractiveness of a single-item target,
as comparedwith a referent consisting of a set of 2, 4, 8, 16, or 24
items. Of the 38 trials, there were 10 each involving 2-item, 4-
item, and 8-item referents. In addition, there were 6 trials involv-
ing referents consisting of 16 items and 2 trials involving refer-
ents consisting of 24 items. The order of trials using referents of a
different set size was counterbalanced across participants.
At the onset of each trial, participants were presented on a
computer screen with a 5×5 matrix consisting of 25 pictures
(items), each representing a different cloth button. Two sets of
pictures, each consisting of 25 items, were used throughout
the experiment, alternating between odd- and even-numbered
trials and counterbalanced across participants. On each con-
secutive odd or even trial, the position of pictures forming the
matrix was rotated, with the rotation order counterbalanced
across participants. The initial presentation of the 5×5 matrix
was always accompanied by the following instruction
appearing at the bottom of the screen: “Please take a look at
the pictures presented above. When you are ready to proceed
to the random choice of items, press 3” (see Fig. 1). At the
pressing of the “3” key, the initial instruction was replaced
with the following comparative judgment question: “How
attractive is the picture outlined in ‘red’ in comparison with
pictures outlined in ‘blue’?” (where “red” and “blue” were
appropriately colored rectangles). A 5-point scale ranging
from 1=“red” is definitely less attractive than “blue” to
5=“red” is definitely more attractive than “blue” was pre-
sented below. After an additional 500 ms, the target and referent
were indicated by means of outlining the target with red and the
referent with blue (see Fig. 2). On each trial, the singleton target
and the multiitem referent were randomly selected and outlined
with appropriate colors. The target was always selected out of the
two items occupying the upper left corner and the lower left
corner of a given matrix. The referent was always selected from
the remaining items, with the stipulation that items forming the
referent were adjacent (and thus, formed a figure that could be
outlined). Participants entered their judgments by pressing nu-
merical keys “1” through “5.”
There were five types of comparisons depending on the
referent size (i.e., 1 vs. 2, 4, 8, 16, or 24). The number of
repeats of each type of comparison depended on the size of the
referent: Comparisons of 1 versus 2, 4, or 8 were repeated 10
times each; comparisons of 1 versus 16 were repeated 6 times;
and 1 versus 24 was repeated twice. Each participant gave
answers on 38 trials. The order of the type of comparison was
fully counterbalanced across participants.
For exploratory purposes, half of the participants were
randomly assigned to the context-present condition, and the
rest to the context-absent condition. In all comparison types,
except 1 versus 24, only part of the matrix was covered by
outlined pictures. In the context-absent condition after the
target and referent were designated, items not outlined were
removed from the screen at the time of answering, so the only
items participants saw belonged to the particular comparison.
In the context-present condition, all the items (outlined and
not outlined) were present during comparison.
Results and discussion
For each participant, we computed mean comparative assess-
ment scores across trials with specific referent set sizes (i.e., 2,
4, 8, 16, 24) and a specific target position (upper vs. lower),
arriving at 10 mean comparative assessments.
As is shown in Fig. 3, for each of the set sizes, assessments
were lower than the midpoint of the direct comparative scale,
indicating that in direct comparative judgments, single-item
targets were evaluated less positively than the multiitem
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referents. A series of single-sample t -tests revealed that the
effect was significant for each of the set sizes, all ps<.001.
This replicates the reversed BTA effect found for four-item
sets by Windschitl et al. (2008) and extends the effect to the
other set sizes used in the present experiment.
To test our main prediction that the magnitude of the
reversed BTA effect would increase as a function of the
referent set size, we first performed a 5 (referent set
size: 2 vs. 4 vs. 8 vs.16 vs. 24) × 2 (target position:
upper vs. lower) × 2 (context: absent vs. present) mul-
tivariate mixed-model ANOVA with the last factor as a
between-subjects variable. As was expected, the main
effect for the referent set size was significant, F (4, 149)
= 11.70, p < .001, partial η2 = .24, indicating that the
magnitude of the reversed BTA effect depended on the
set size of the referent. No other significant effects
emerged. The main effect of referent group size was
then tested using the trend analysis, revealing a signif-
icant linear trend, F (1, 152) = 29.96, p < .001, partial
η2 = .16. Figure 3 presents the means of comparative
assessments for each of the referent sizes. As can be
seen, the reversed BTA effect occurred for each of the
referent set sizes: All means fell below a midpoint of
the direct comparative scale, thus indicating preference
for the multiitem referent over the single-item target.
Furthermore, as was predicted, the larger the set size,
the stronger the preference was.2
Experiment 2
Overview
Experiment 2 had two goals. First, we wanted to replicate the
results of Experiment 1, using different types of stimuli and
Fig. 1 An example of how the
initial 25-item matrix appeared on
the computer screen before
participants proceeded through
the part of random choice of the
target and referent group
2 This effect of a referent set-size in direct-comparative judgments might
be assessed differently. In their research, Price and colleagues (2006) state
that different types of judgments tend to increase as a roughly logarithmic
function of the size of a group.We have followed their strategy to analyze
data within a regression approach (see full procedure in Lorch &
Myers,1990). First we computed mean comparative assessment across
trials with different referent set sizes (ignoring other factors, nonsignifi-
cant in omnibus ANOVA), then for each participant we regressed their
five mean comparative assessments onto the natural logarithm of the
referent set-size, thus obtaining single regression coefficients for each
participant. As expected, the average regression coefficient (M=−.66;
SD=1.6) was significantly lower than 0, indicating an overall effect of a
referent set-size, t(153)=5.01, p<.001. The comparative assessments
decreased as a function of a logarithm of a referent set- size.
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different modes of presentation. Second, we attempted to
extend the results of Experiment 1 to indirect comparisons
based on separate attractiveness judgments of singletons and
multiitem sets. This would provide indirect evidence that both
the reversed BTA effect in direct comparisons and the sensi-
tivity of this effect to the referent set size are due to the
increased attractiveness of larger sets.
Method
Participants One hundred sixty Polish college students (104
women, 56 men) participated in the experiment.
Stimuli Fifteen photographs of buildings (architectural mon-
uments) and 15 photographs of cupcakes were used as stimuli.
The stimuli were selected from larger sets of relatively unfa-
miliar photographs on the basis of attractiveness ratings pro-
vided by two independent samples of 72 students (buildings)
and 90 students (cupcakes). A 5-point scale was used to
collect judgments of buildings, and a 7-point scale was used
to collect judgments of cupcakes. For each set, only photo-
graphs with mean ratings above the scale’s midpoint were
used in the experiment.
Design and procedure Participants were tested individually in
a computer lab. The experiment was divided into two stages.
During the first stage, participants made direct comparative
judgments of attractiveness involving single-item targets and
three-item or eight-item referents. During the second stage, the
attractiveness of each of the single-item and multiitem stimuli
used during the first stage was judged separately.
1. The first stage consisted of 20 trials divided into four
blocks of 5 trials each. Two different referent set sizes
(three vs. eight) were used in the odd-numbered and the
even-numbered blocks and were counterbalanced across
participants. Also, two different types of stimuli (build-
ings vs. cupcakes) were used during the first two and the
Fig. 2 An example of how the
participants were asked the
comparative question. This figure
presents 1 versus 16 comparisons
in the context-present condition.
The target is denoted with red,
and the referent group with blue
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second two blocks, again counterbalanced across
participants. At the onset of each trial, participants
were presented on a computer screen with a 5 × 3
(columns and rows, respectively) matrix consisting
of 15 pictures of cupcakes or 15 pictures of build-
ings, each representing a different stimulus. Within
each of the four blocks, the position of the pictures
forming the matrix for each of the 5 trials was
rotated, with the rotation order counterbalanced
across participants. All other aspects of the proce-
dure during the first stage were the same as in
Experiment 1, except for the following:For half of
the participants, the target and referent always occu-
pied an adjacent position and together formed a 2 ×
2 or a 3 × 3 matrix (for three-item and eight-item
referents, respectively). For the remaining partici-
pants, the target and referent were separated by at
least one other item. This manipulation was includ-
ed for exploratory purposes.
2. In addition, for half of the participants, the target was
always outlined in red and the referent was always
outlined in green, while for the other half, this was re-
versed. This was done to eliminate a potential source of
confounding present in Experiment 1.
3. The target was always randomly selected out of the entire
15-item matrix, thus making its location less predictable.
4. No initial instruction asking participants to look at the
pictures and to press a key when ready to proceed
was presented.
5. No context manipulation was included in the design; for
each trial, all 15 items remained on the screen for the
duration of the trial.
The second stage of the experiment consisted of 20 pairs of
trials, each calling for an absolute judgment of either target or
referent used in one of the 20 comparative judgments collect-
ed during the first stage and presented in the same order as
during the first stage. For each of the original target/referent
combinations, two absolute judgments were made in consec-
utive trials, with the order (target first vs. referent first)
counterbalanced across participants. On each trial, the original
stimulus (target or referent) was presented as part of the same
5×3 matrix as that during the first stage; however, only the
target or only the referent was outlined on a given trial. The
colors used to outline the targets and referents were the same
as during the first stage (green for targets and red for referents
or red for targets and green for referents). Judgments were
made on a scale from 1 (very unattractive) to 5 (very attrac-
tive) in response to the following question: “How attractive is
(are) the building (buildings) [or the cupcake (cupcakes)]
marked with red [green]?”
Results and discussion
Direct comparative judgments For the first stage of the ex-
periment, for each participant, we computed mean direct
comparative assessment scores across trials with specific ref-
erent set-sizes (i.e., three vs. eight) and specific stimulus type
(buildings vs. cupcakes), thus arriving at four scores.
As is shown in the upper panel of Table 1, for larger set sizes,
for both buildings and cupcakes, assessments were signifi-
cantly lower than the midpoint of the direct comparative scale,
indicating that single-item targets were evaluated less posi-
tively than the multiitem referents, thus replicating the re-
versed BTA effect found by Windschitl et al. (2008) and in
our Experiment 1. The same tendency could be observed for
smaller set sizes, but the effects were not significant.
To test the prediction that the magnitude of the reversed
BTA effect would be greater for larger than for smaller sets,
we performed a 2 (referent set size: three vs. eight)×2 (mate-
rial: buildings vs. cupcakes)×2 (target/referent placement:
adjacent vs. separated) multivariate mixed-model ANOVA
with the last factor as a between-subjects variable. Consistent
with our predictions and with the results of Experiment 1, the
preference for multiitem referents over singleton targets was
more pronounced—further below the midpoint—for larger
(M =2.83) than for smaller (M =2.95) referents, resulting in
the significant main effect of the referent set size, F (1, 158)=
9.73, p <.005, partial η2=.06. This effect occurred regardless
of the material (buildings vs. cupcakes) and regardless of the
target/referent placement (adjacent vs. separated); neither in-
teraction approached significance. The only additional effect
approaching significance was an unexpected main effect of
the material, F(1, 158)=2.95, p =.09, partial η2=.02, indicat-
ing that the preference for referents over targets was somewhat
Fig. 3 Mean comparative attractiveness judgments as a function of the
referent set size. Judgments were made on a 5-point comparative scale,
where 1 indicated preference for the multiitem set (referent) and 5
indicated preference for the singleton (target). Scores below scale mid-
point (3) indicate preference for the multiitem set
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more pronounced for buildings (M =2.86) than for cupcakes
(M =2.92).
Absolute judgments For each participant, we used absolute
judgments collected during the second stage to compute mean
absolute judgment scores for singletons and multiitem sets
from the first stage. This was done for three-item and eight-
item trials and for buildings and cupcakes, separately. A 2
(stimulus type: singletons vs. multiitem sets)×2 (referent set
size: trials with three-item referents vs. trials with eight-item
referents )×2 (material: buildings vs. cupcakes) repeated mea-
sures ANOVA performed on mean absolute judgments re-
vealed a main effect of stimulus type, F(1, 158)=116.84, p
<.001, partial η2=.42, a main effect of referent set size, F (1,
158)=75.54, p <.001, partial η2=.32, and a stimulus type×
referent set size interaction, F (1, 158)=75.92, p <.001, partial
η2=.32. As can be seen in Table 1, consistent with the re-
versed BTA effect found for direct comparative judgments,
absolute judgments were lower for singleton targets than for
multiitem referents. This was true for both three-item and
eight-item referents, but the effect for the eight-item referents
was stronger, F (1, 158)=12.2, p <.01, partial η2=.07, and
F(1, 158)=169,53, p <.001, partial η2=.52, respectively. As
would be expected, the main effect of the referent set size was
due entirely to higher absolute judgments for multiple-item
sets consisting of eight items than for such sets consisting of
three items, F(1, 158)=122,95, p <.001, partial η2=.44. Ab-
solute judgments of singletons were not affected by whether
they came from trials with three-item or eight-item referents,
F(1, 158)<1, n.s.
This pattern of results is fully consistent with the notion
that, for attractive stimuli, both (1) the reversed BTA effect in
direct comparative judgments and (2) its sensitivity to the size
of a multiitem referent are due to increased attractiveness of
larger sets, with singletons judged as least attractive. Because,
on the basis of absolute judgments, singletons are perceived as
less attractive than multiitem sets and because multiitem sets
composed of fewer items are perceived as less attractive than
sets composed of larger number of items, with no other
intervening factors, the reversed BTA effect would be
expected. Furthermore, such an effect should be stronger
for larger than for smaller sets, the pattern observed in
both our experiments.
General discussion
In making direct comparative judgments, participants in the
present experiments judged singletons as less attractive than
multiitem sets. This occurred for different modes of presenta-
tion and for different types of stimuli. Because the stimuli
were preselected as relatively attractive (above the scale mid-
point), it may be concluded that the singletons were evaluated
as less extreme than the multiitem sets. This result constitutes
a conceptual replication of the reversed BTA effect demon-
strated by Windschitl et al. (2008). The reversed effect oc-
curred even though (similar to Windschitl et al., 2008,
Experiment 2) participants made judgments with singletons
denoted as targets and multiitem sets denoted as referents, a
condition often considered as facilitating the occurrence of the
usual (nonreversed) BTA effect (e.g., Chambers &
Windschitl, 2004; Suls et al., 2010).
Admittedly, both the present demonstration of the reversed
effect and the previous demonstration by Windschitl et al.
(2008) are limited to judgments of attractiveness of stimuli
preselected as relatively attractive.Whether a parallel reversed
effect can be found for unattractive stimuli remains to be
demonstrated. Similarly, future research should attempt to
examine reversed effects in comparative judgments involv-
ing attributes other than attractiveness (e.g., frequency,
size, probability, etc.).
Another potential limitation of present research that is
shared with the previous demonstration of the reversed BTA
effect by Windschitl et al. (2008) concerns the wording of
instructions for making comparisons between singletons and
multiitem sets. Specifically, no explicit reference was included
to using the average of the set in making comparative
Table 1 Mean judgments regarding stimuli by the within-subjects con-
ditions of the Experiment 2
Referent Size
3 8 Significance (Set Size Effect)
Direct Comparison Judgments
Buildings 2.94 2.78** p <.01
Cupcakes 2.97 2.88* p =.075
Overall 2.95 2.83** p <.005
Absolute Judgments: Targets
Buildings 3.31** 3.27** n.s.
Cupcakes 3.37** 3.37** n.s.
Overall 3.35** 3.33** n.s.
Absolute Judgments: Referents
Buildings 3.44** 3.82** p <.001
Cupcakes 3.50** 3.89** p <.001
Overall 3.47** 3.87** p <.001
Note . Direct comparative judgments were scored from 1 to 5. Values
below midpoint (3) indicate preference for the multiitem set. Asterisks
indicate significant deviation from the midpoint (target being equally
attractive as referent), by a one-sample t-test. Absolute judgments were
scored from 1 to 5, with higher numbers indicating greater perceived
attractiveness of a stimulus. Asterisks indicate significant deviation from
the midpoint (moderately attractive) by a one-sample t-test. Last column
reflects the significance of the difference between means
*p <.05
**p <.001
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judgments. Instead, participants were simply asked to make a
comparison between the singleton and the set. Perhaps includ-
ing such specific reference to relying on averages could dis-
courage participants from using the “pick-the-best” strategy,
thus reducing or eliminating the effect.
Notwithstanding those limitations, our results clearly show
that the reversed BTA effect, as originally demonstrated by
Windschitl et al. (2008), is sensitive to the size of the
multiitem set used as a referent: The magnitude of the effect
increases with the set size. In Experiment 1, when the design
permitted testing for linearity of the relationship between the
magnitude of the reversed BTA effect and the set size, the
relationship was shown to be linear.
Data from Experiment 2 regarding absolute (noncomparative)
judgments for singletons and multiitem sets that were used as
targets and referents in direct comparative judgments in that
experiment shed light on why the reversed BTA effect occurs
(when it does) and why it is stronger for larger set sizes. The data
show that (for attractive stimuli) judged attractiveness increases
with the set size. Thus, singletons are judged as less attractive
than multiitem sets, and smaller multiitem sets are judged as less
attractive than larger multiitem sets.
Our finding that the magnitude of the reversed BTA effect
in direct comparative judgments increases with the increased
set size brings to mind results obtained by Price et al. (2006,
Experiment 2). Those authors showed that direct comparative
judgments regarding vulnerability of self, as compared with
others, decreased with the number of others involved in the
comparison. In relating the present results to the results ob-
tained by Price et al., it might be helpful to distinguish be-
tween two aspects: (1) overestimation versus underestimation
of extremity in judgments of singletons, as compared with
multiitem sets, and (2) the impact of the set size on the
magnitude of such over- or underestimation.
With respect to the first aspect, Price et al. (2006,
Experiment 2) obtained the classic effect: more extreme judg-
ments for singletons. Specifically, relatively unlikely events
(becoming an alcoholic, breaking a bone, or getting cancer)
were judged in direct comparisons as less likely (thus, more
extreme) for the self (singleton) than for the average group
member (multiitem set). In contrast, the reversed effect was
demonstrated in the present experiments, thus replicating the
results of Windschitl et al. (2008, Experiments 1, 2, and 3).
Specifically, our results show that relatively attractive single-
tons were judged as less attractive (less extreme) when com-
pared with the attractiveness of a multiitem set. In this respect,
our results are opposite to the results obtained by Price et al.
With respect to the second aspect, our results are parallel to
those in Price et al. (2006, Experiment 2) and show that the
reversed effect is subject to a similar set size bias as the classic
effect: In both cases, larger set sizes are associated with larger
effects. Yet those findings are in contrast to the null results
reported by Suls et al. (2010) for both social and nonsocial
stimuli. While any interpretation of null results is, of course,
problematic, it should be noted that Suls et al. (2010) used
stimuli that were participant generated and highly familiar. In
contrast, stimuli used by Price et al. and stimuli used in the
present experiments were experimenter generated and rela-
tively unfamiliar. This might suggest that high familiarity of
stimulus materials limits bias due to the set size, perhaps
because processing of highly familiar material requires fewer
cognitive resources. Another, less interesting possibility is that
the null results reported by Suls et al. (2010) reflect relatively
low power resulting from manipulating the set size variable
between participants. In contrast, both Price et al. and the
present authors employed within-participants manipulations
(with sample sizes similar to those in Suls et al., 2010).
Clearly, not enough is known about conditions leading to
classic versus reversed BTA effects. While the present exper-
iments were not designed to tackle this problem, our results
are consistent with the notion that the classic effect may occur
as a result of situational factors that facilitate focusing atten-
tion on the singleton just before the judgment is made. In
particular, as was suggested by Windschitl et al. (2008),
presenting a singleton target only after the multiitem referent
is presented may force focusing attention on the singleton.
This could make the singleton more vivid at the time the
comparative judgment is made, leading to the classic BTA
effect. Similar toWindschitl et al. (2008, Experiments 1, 2, 3),
such timing conditions focusing attention on the singletons
were not present in either of our experiments, perhaps con-
tributing to a successful replication of the reversed BTA effect.
Obviously, factors other than timing might have been re-
sponsible for the increased attention to singletons, as com-
pared with multiitem sets, contributing to the occurrence of
the classic BTA effect in many previous studies. In particular,
comparing self (singleton) with others (multiitem set) seems
likely to give the singleton an attentional advantage because of
the high chronic accessibility of the self (Chambers &
Windschitl, 2004; Markus, 1980; Rogers, 1981). Indeed, nu-
merous studies have found classic BTA/WTA effects for self–
others comparisons (e.g., Aclicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher,
Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Brown, 2012; Chambers et al.,
2003; Kruger, 1999; Kruger & Burrus, 2004; More & Small,
2007; Price et al., 2006).3
In any case, the results obtained in Experiment 2 for abso-
lute (noncomparative) judgments showing that singletons,
when judged separately, were seen as less attractive than
multiitem sets suggest that it is the reversed, and not the
classic, BTA effect that should be expected in direct compar-
ative judgments when no additional situational or chronic
3 Interestingly, simply denoting singleton as target does not seem to give
it enough advantage over multi-item referent to produce the classic effect:
both in Windschitl et al., (2008, Experiment 2) and in the present
experiments, reversed BTA effect was observed in spite of designating
singletons as targets and multi-item sets as referents.
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factors leading to increased attention to the singletons are
present. Furthermore, the pattern showing lower absolute
judgments for smaller than for larger multiitem sets is fully
consistent with our finding that the magnitude of the reversed
BTA effect in direct comparative judgment increases with the
increased size of the multiitem set. Thus, we believe that
findings regarding the relationship between set size and abso-
lute judgments advance our understating of the nature of the
reversed BTA effect and its dependency on the size of the
multiitem set. Yet the nature of the relationship between set
size and absolute judgments is not entirely clear. Future re-
search will undoubtedly focus on the contribution of various
mechanisms responsible for effects regarding absolute judg-
ments, including the “pick-the-best” strategy (Szutkiewicz-
Szekalska & Niewiarowski, in press; Windschitl et al., 2008)
and the sample size bias (Smith & Price, 2010).
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